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taxed as gain to the taxpayer.  The debt ($43,356) would be
paid off and the difference between the debt and fair market
value or $11,079 would be paid to the debtor less any
expenses involved.  For the Campbell property, the usual
outcome would be for the difference between the basis and
fair market value ($106,620—$84,459) or $22,161 to be
taxed as gain to the taxpayer.  The debt ($88,491) would be
paid off and the difference between the debt and fair market
value or $18,129 would be paid to the debtor, again less
any expenses involved.
The opinion in Emmons v. Commissioner9 recites that
indeed the mortgages were paid off on the respective
properties but that the debtor did not receive the excess of
fair market value over the mortgage on either property.
The opinion states that “petitioners did not receive any
other amounts from the sale” on either the Honore property
or the Campbell property.
It is not clear from the opinion why the debtor did not
receive the overplus from the foreclosure sale.  Presumably,
it was because other creditors laid claim to the proceeds
although other explanations are possible.
The Commissioner, properly, determined that the
taxpayers had long-term capital gains in the amount of
$43,633, computed as the difference between the total sale
price of both sales ($161,055) and the taxpayers’ total
adjusted basis in both properties ($117,422).10  At the trial,
the Commissioner “…conceded $29,208 of the $43,633
adjustment for capital gains, and now contends that
petitioners only had gain of $14,425, which is the
difference between their total adjusted basis in the two
properties ($117,422) and the combined mortgage
liabilities from which they were relieved ($131,847).”11
The taxpayers continued to claim they had no gain because
they did not receive any proceeds from the foreclosure
sales.12
The Tax Court held that the taxpayers had gain of
$14,425, the extent to which the mortgages exceeded their
basis in the properties.13
Was the case correctly decided?
There is no doubt that the taxpayers had gain to the extent
the mortgages exceeded their bases in the two properties.
The question is why the taxpayers did not have gain of
$43,633, the difference between the foreclosure sale price
and the adjusted basis on each of the two properties.
 •  If the taxpayers’ other creditors laid claim to the
balance of the foreclosure proceeds, that should not affect
the gain to the taxpayers of $43,633.  The other debt was
simply paid off with the foreclosure sale proceeds in a
manner similar to the mortgages on the two rental
properties.
•  If the taxpayers, through inattention or otherwise, did
not collect the overplus, that arguably should not affect the
amount of gain, either.  Depending upon the circumstances,
the taxpayers might have a deduction for the amount
reported into income yet not received.
The case may have been correctly decided but the
decision raises questions for which answers are not
provided.  Most importantly, why did the Commissioner
concede the gain of $29,208?
FOOTNOTES
1 Emmons v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-173.  See
generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 39.02 (1997); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[13] (1998).  See also
Harl, “Gain From Insolvent Taxpayers,” 6 Agric. L. Dig.
97 (1995); Harl, “Turn Over of Assets to Creditors,” 1
Agric. L. Dig. 69 (1990).
2 See Rev. Rul. 73-36, 1973-1 C.B. 372 (capital loss
measured by difference between basis and amount of
cancelled obligation).
3 See, e.g., Gehl v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 784 (1984), aff’d,
95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,191 (8th Cir. 1995)
(excess of fair market value of property over basis was
gain for insolvent taxpayer).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (c), Ex. 8.  See, e.g., Bressi v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-651.
5 Id.  See I.R.C. § 108.
6 T.C. Memo. 1998-173.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 T.C. Memo. 1998-173.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
D O G S . The plaintiff’s cattle were killed by a dog
belonging to the defendant who admitted liability for the loss
of the cattle. The issue was whether the plaintiff could be
awarded double damages (limited to double the value of the
livestock) under Or. Rev. Stat. § 609.140(1), since the action
was brought more than three years after the loss of the cattle.
The plaintiff argued that the double damage provision was
compensatory and not subject to the three year statute of
limitations applied to penalty damages under Or. Rev. Stat. §
12.100(2). The court examined the legislative history of the
double damages provision and held that the legislature
intended the double damages to be only compensatory;
therefore, the plaintiff could be awarded double the value of
the livestock in an action brought more than three years after
the loss involved. Diaz v. Coyle, 953 P.2d 773 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998).
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BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
F E E S . Under 11 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1), various fees
associated with bankruptcy filings are adjusted for inflation
every three years:
   11 U.S.C. Before New
     Section                                                                   April 1, 1998                           dollar amount
Section 109(e)--allowable debt
limits for filing bankruptcy
under Chapter 13 $250,000 $269,250
                                                                                       750,000                                  807,750
Section 303(b)--minimum aggregate
claims needed for the commencement
of an involuntary bankruptcy:
  (1)--in paragraph (1) 10,000 10,775
  (2)--in paragraph (2)                                                                                        10,000                                  10,775   
Section 507(a)--priority claims:
(1)--in paragraph (3) 4,000 4,300
(2)--in paragraph (4)(B)(i) 4,000 4,300
(3)--in paragraph (5) 4,000 4,300
   (4)--in paragraph (6)                                                                                       1,800                                  1,950   
Section 522(d)--value of property
exemptions allowed to the debtor:
(1)--in paragraph (1) 15,000 16,150
(2)--in paragraph (2) 2,400 2,575
(3)--in paragraph (3) 400 425
8,000 8,625
(4)--in paragraph (4) 1,000 1,075
(5)--in paragraph (5) 800 850
7,500 8,075
(6)--in paragraph (6) 1,500 1,625
(7)--in paragraph (8) 8,000 8,625
   (8)--in paragraph (11)(D)                                                                                                15,000                                        1   6,150
Section 523(a)(2)(C)--“luxury goods
and services” or cash advances obtained
by the consumer debtor within 60 days
before the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
which are considered nondischargeable. 1,000 1,075
63 Fed. Reg. 7179 (Feb. 12, 1998).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor had purchased 11
horses from a creditor on an installment basis. The debtor
was to make monthly payments and the creditor would
transfer one set of registration papers for each installment.
The debtor made only two installments and the creditor sued
in state court on the contract. The court ordered seizure of the
horses by the sheriff who boarded the horses with the
creditor. The horses were in this state when the debtor filed
for Chapter 12 and sought return of the horses and the
registration papers as estate property. The court held that,
under state law, the debtor had property rights in the horses
and papers because the horses had not yet been sold by the
sheriff. Therefore, the horses and papers were estate property
upon the bankruptcy filing and were to be returned to the
estate. However, the court required the debtor to provide
adequate protection of the creditor’s interest in the horses and
papers before the turnover was to be made. In re Becker,
217 B.R. 231 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
LEVY. The debtors filed for Chapter 13 and made
payments to the Chapter 13 trust account. The IRS had filed
a claim for unpaid taxes. The debtors voluntarily dismissed
the case and the IRS filed a notice of levy with the trustee to
collect taxes owed by the debtors. The debtors sought
recovery of the money to them. The court found that the
taxes were owing and the levy was properly filed. The
Bankruptcy Court ordered the funds returned to the debtors
because of Section 1362(a)(2). The District Court reversed,
holding that the principle of judicial economy required the
court to order payment of the money to the IRS because the
IRS would be able to immediately levy the funds directly
from the debtors. In re Beam, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,469 (D. Or. 1998).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. This case is one
of 50 or more cases currently pending in Iowa District courts.
The plaintiff cooperative and defendant grain farmer had
been doing business for many years, using many types of
grain transactions, including grain forward contracts. In 1991
through 1996, the parties entered into several hedge-to-arrive
(HTA) contracts for corn and soybeans, usually with no
problems because the defendant used the contracts for only a
small portion of the total harvest, grain prices did not
fluctuate much during the contracts, and the defendant
usually delivered during the first year. However, in 1995, the
parties entered into large three year HTA contracts and
during the contracts, the price of corn increased above the
contract price. In addition, the defendant’s production was
insufficient to meet the contract amounts and the defendant
sought to roll over the contracts to later production years.
When the contract and current corn prices became too
divergent, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant which
indicated that the plaintiff wanted to terminate the contracts
with delivery of the grain by the defendant. The defendant
responded in writing that the defendant was repudiating the
contracts unless the contracts were later found to be
enforceable, in which case the defendant would continue to
perform under the contracts. The plaintiff then demanded
adequate assurance that the defendant would deliver the corn
in the contracts. The defendant had sought clarification of the
terms of the contract and refused to promise delivery until
those terms were settled. However, the defendant made
written assurance that, if the contracts were held to be
enforceable, the defendant would perform on the contracts.
The plaintiff canceled the contracts and brought suit for
anticipatory breach of contract. The court held that the
defendant’s repudiation of the contract was reasonable
grounds for insecurity sufficient to require adequate
assurance but also held that, given the history of the
defendant to perform on contracts, the defendant’s written
promise to perform was adequate assurance. Therefore, the
court held that the plaintiff’s cancellation of the contract was
a breach of contract and precluded the plaintiff’s recovery of
any damages on the contract. See also Harl, “Adequate
Assurance in Contracts,” 9 Agric. L. Dig. 41 (1998). Land
O’Lakes, Inc. v. Hanig, No. EQCV056593 (Iowa D. Ct.
May 29, 1998).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations covering specific crop provisions for the
insurance of stonefruit to be used in conjunction with the
Common Crop Insurance Policy, Basic Provisions. The
amendments restrict the effect of the current stonefruit
endorsement to the 1998 and prior crop years. 63 Fed. Reg.
29933 (June 2, 1998).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which include
the processing beans endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to
1998 and earlier crop years. 63 Fed. Reg. 31331 (June 9,
1998).
FARM LOANS. The FSA has adopted as final regulations
which provide that a Notice of the Availability of Loan
Service and Debt Settlement Programs for Delinquent Farm
Borrowers will be sent after a borrower is dismissed from
bankruptcy if the borrower was not previously notified and
the account was not accelerated. 63 Fed. Reg. 29339 (May
29, 1998).
PRODUCTION LOANS. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations under the production flexibility contract
regulations.
The regulations add a final date for producers to designate
payment shares and provide supporting documentation to be
eligible to earn contract payments in a given fiscal year when
payment shares have not been designated in such fiscal year.
All producers sharing in the contract payment on a farm,
whose payment shares have not been designated for such
fiscal year, must sign a new contract designating payment
shares, and provide supporting documentation no later than
August 1 of such fiscal year to be eligible to earn a contract
payment in such fiscal year.
The regulations change the dates a producer or owner must
inform the county committee of changes in interest. A
producer or owner must inform the county committee of
changes in interest by August 1 of the fiscal year in which
the change is made if producers on the contract remain the
same but payment shares change; or no later than August 1 of
such fiscal year, if a new producer is being added to the
contract.
The regulations add a final date to request advance
payments for fiscal year 1998 and each subsequent fiscal
year. To receive the advance payment for fiscal year 1998,
and each subsequent fiscal year, all producers sharing in the
contract payment on the farm must, no later than 15 days
prior to the final date to issue the advance payment: (1) sign
the contract designating payment shares and provide
supporting documentation, if applicable; and (2) request the
advance payment.
The regulations clarify that a lease is a cash lease, if the
lessor receives only a guaranteed sum certain cash payment,
or fixed quantity of the crop. This rule also changes
provisions with respect to combination leases. Combination
leases are leases that contain provisions for both a guaranteed
amount such as a fixed dollar amount, or quantity and a share
of a crop or crop proceeds. Combination leases include those
leases that provide for the greater of a guaranteed amount, or
share of the crop or crop proceeds. The amendment provides
that all combination leases shall be considered share leases
for fiscal year 1998, and later fiscal years.
The regulations change the date by which all landowners,
tenants and sharecroppers failing to reach an agreement
regarding the division of contract payments for a fiscal year,
must execute a contract to be eligible to receive the contract
payment for such fiscal year. If the landowners, tenants and
sharecroppers on a farm fail to reach an agreement regarding
the division of contract payments for a fiscal year, the county
committee shall make the payment at a later date if all
persons eligible to receive a share of the contract payment
have executed a contract no later than August 1 of that fiscal
year, and subsequently agreed to the division of contract
payment. 63 Fed. Reg. 31102 (June 8, 1998).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations amending the tuberculosis regulations concerning
the interstate movement of cattle and bison by raising the
designation of Hawaii from an accredited-free (suspended)
state to an accredited-free state. 63 Fed. Reg. 30582 (June 5,
1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.02[1].* The decedent had established a trust for
descendants of the decedent’s spouse’s parents and the
descendants of unrelated persons. All of the persons who had
an interest in the trust were skip persons because they were at
least two generations below the decedent; therefore, the trust
was a skip person under I.R.C. § 2613(a)(2) because all
interests in the trust were held by skip persons. The IRS ruled
that the devise from the decedent’s will to the trust was a
direct skip under I.R.C. § 2612(c)(1) because the devise was
a transfer subject to a tax imposed by Chapter 11 of an
interest in property to a skip person. For purposes of future
distributions from the trust, the IRS ruled that, under I.R.C. §
2653(a), the trust would be treated as if the transferor of the
property was one generation higher than the highest
generation having an interest in the trust. The highest
generation with an interest in the trust was the grandnephew
and grandniece generation. Accordingly, for purposes of
determining whether future distributions were subject to the
GST, the transferor would be deemed to be a member of the
niece and nephew generation. The great-grandnieces and
great-grandnephews would be considered skip persons
because they were at least two generations below the niece
and nephew generation. The children of the decedent's
unrelated friends also were skip persons because their
generation assignment was three generations below the
decedent and therefore, two generations below the nieces and
nephews after the application of I.R.C. § 2653(a). Because
the grandnieces and grandnephews were no longer members
of a generation which was at least two generations below the
transferor, the IRS concluded that distributions to the
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grandnieces and grandnephews would not be transfers
subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9823006, Feb. 25, 1998.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The decedent
had created a trust prior to 1981 and the decedent’s will
provided for funding of the trust from the residuary estate an
amount equal to “the maximum marital deduction allowable
to my estate for federal estate tax purposes, except that this
sum shall not exceed the minimum amount which…will
reduce the federal estate tax payable to zero.” The decedent
died after 1981. The IRS ruled that the clause was not a
maximum marital deduction clause and that the entire
amount passing to the trust was eligible for the marital
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9822056, Mar. 5, 1998.
The taxpayer owned an interest in retirement plans and
elected to receive an annuity from the plans after retirement.
The annuity was based on the lives of the taxpayer’s children
and upon the death of the taxpayer, would be paid to a trust
for the surviving spouse. The spouse was to receive the
annuity as trust income and the trust income was not to be
charged with the taxes associated with the annuity. The IRS
ruled that the annuity would be included in the taxpayer’s
gross estate and the value of the annuity at the taxpayer’s
death would be eligible for the automatic QTIP election if
made by the executor. Ltr. Rul. 9822031, Feb. 25, 1998.
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY. Under the decedent’s
will, the taxpayer was to receive one half of the proceeds of
the sale of a residence. A will contest resulted in a stipulation
by the heirs that the taxpayer would receive the residence.
The residence was sold for an amount less than the estate tax
valuation amount and the taxpayer claimed a loss as a
deduction because the property was held for rental when
sold. The court held that the residence was not owned by the
taxpayer on the date of sale because the taxpayer provided no
evidence of ownership and the closing statement for the sale
listed the decedent’s estate as the owner. Hummel v.
Comm’r, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,462 (S.D. Ind.
1998).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The IRS has issued a
memorandum on the estate and income tax consequences of
the sale of a decedent’s personal residence by the estate for a
loss. The IRS stated that a loss was allowed to the estate only
to the extent the residence was operated as income-producing
property. In addition, a loss would not be allowed if, under
state law, title to the property passed immediately to the heirs
upon the decedent’s death, such that the estate had no
ownership interest in the property before the sale. The IRS
also stated that, if a loss was allowable, the loss was
reportable on the estate income tax return and included in
calculating DNI. SCA 1998-012.
VALUATION. The issue in this case was the fair market
value of three tracts of farmland included in the decedent’s
estate. Both the estate and the IRS used the comparables
method and provided expert appraisals to support the
valuation. The court found several inaccuracies in the estate
expert’s appraisal method, determining that the estate’s
appraiser first determined a value of the land and then sought
comparables to match the predetermined value. The appraiser
was found to have used erroneous data from the comparable
sales and to have used sales more than 20 years old. Because
the estate’s appraiser’s appraisal was completely discredited,
the court upheld the IRS’s valuation. Est. of Hagerman v.
U.S., 98-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,312 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CASUALTY LOSSES. The U.S. Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in the following case. The taxpayer had
established a brokerage account with a broker who used
fraudulent means to make unauthorized transactions with the
account. A precipitous drop in the stock market caused a
large loss in the taxpayer’s account and the taxpayer sued the
broker and the brokerage firm for recovery of losses resulting
from unauthorized trading on the account by the broker. At
the end of a tax year, the case was pending and the taxpayer
claimed a loss deduction. The Tax Court had denied the
deduction, holding that the law suit against the broker had a
reasonable chance of a recovery for the taxpayer since there
was ample evidence of the broker’s fraudulent use of the
taxpayer’s account. During the pendency of the tax case, the
taxpayer received a negotiated settlement with the broker.
The taxpayer argued that the Tax Court had impermissably
considered the settlement as evidence that the loss was
recoverable at the end of the tax year. The appellate court
affirmed the Tax Court decision, although the appellate court
held that the Tax Court could not consider subsequent events
in determining whether a loss was recoverable at the end of a
previous tax year. The appellate court found that the Tax
Court had not relied on the settlement in determining that the
loss recovery was reasonably possible at the end of the prior
tax year.  Jeppsen v. Comm’r, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,878 (10th Cir. 1997), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-342.
C O O P E R A T I V E . The taxpayer was an exempt
agricultural cooperative. The cooperative facility included 40
acres with several storage buildings. During the winter
months, the cooperative rented the space for a fee to the
public for storing trailers, campers, motor homes, boats and
cars. The items were placed in storage by volunteer members
of the cooperative. The IRS ruled that the storage operation
was an unrelated business and the volunteer involvement in
the operation was insufficient to exempt the unrelated
business income from taxation because the income was
related primarily to the storage of the items and not the
movement of the items in and out of storage. See Rev. Rul.
78-144, 1978-1 C.B. 168. Ltr. Rul. 9822006, Jan. 29, 1998.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM § 4.02[15].*
The taxpayer was a corporation wholly owned by another
corporation. The parent corporation sold parts to the taxpayer
with the sales documented by accounts receivable. The
accounts receivable were bona fide debt from the taxpayer to
the parent corporation. The accounts receivable equaled the
current fair market value of the parts in the taxpayer’s
inventory. The taxpayer had financial difficulties and the
parent corporation canceled much of the accounts receivable.
The IRS ruled that, under either I.R.C. § 108(e)(6) or §
108(e)(10)(A), the cancellation of the debt did not cause
recognition of discharge of indebtedness income to the
taxpayer and did not cause any change in the taxpayer’s cost
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of goods sold deduction. The IRS characterized the
transaction as a contribution of capital from the parent to the
taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 9822005, Jan. 16, 1998.
EMPLOYMENT TAXES. Under previous rules, if an
employer had $500 or more of quarterly withheld
employment taxes, the employer was required to make
monthly deposits. The IRS has announced that the $500
amount has been increased to $1,000. If an employer has less
than that amount due, the entire amount can be paid at the
time of filing for the taxes. IR-98-43.
The taxpayer employed foreign agricultural workers to
harvest seasonal crops. The workers were illegal aliens who
applied for permanent resident status under the Special
Agricultural Workers (SAW) program. The taxpayer did not
withhold or pay federal employment taxes for the wages paid
to these workers, claiming that the workers were exempt
under I.R.C. § 3121(b)(1) as temporary agricultural workers.
The court cited Moorehead v. U.S., 774 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.
1985)  as establishing the requirements for temporary
agricultural worker status for aliens: (1) the workers had to
be lawfully admitted to the U.S. on a temporary basis and (2)
the workers had to be lawfully admitted to the U.S. solely to
perform agricultural labor. The court examined the SAW
application process and determined that the process had three
distinct stages: (1) application by the worker, (2) grant of
temporary residence, and (3) grant of permanent residence.
The court held that, during the first step of the process, the
worker could remain in the U.S. only until a determination
was made on the application and could perform only
agricultural labor; therefore, during that stage of the process,
the worker was exempt and the employer was not required to
withhold and pay employment taxes. In re Sun World
Intern., Inc., 217 B.R. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. The taxpayers were
Quakers who paid only a portion of their taxes, excluding the
pro rata share of taxes equal to the share of the budget spent
on the Department of Defense. The taxpayers sought a ruling
prohibiting the IRS from assessing penalties and interest on
the unpaid taxes and requiring the IRS to separately levy for
the unpaid taxes. The taxpayers believed that the separate
levy would then be prohibited as against their religious
beliefs. The court cited several precedents and held that
religious belief was not an allowed excuse for failure to file
and pay federal taxes. Browne v. U.S., 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,461 (D. Vt. 1998).
FUEL TAX. President Clinton on June 9 signed the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)
reauthorization bill, including the following tax-related
provisions:
All Highway Trust Fund excise taxes are extended through
Sept. 30, 2005.
The ethanol and renewable-source methanol tax provisions
are extended through Sept. 30, 2007, for the excise tax
reduction and Dec. 31, 2007, for the income tax credit,
respectively. The ethanol benefit is reduced from 54 cents
per gallon to 53 cents per gallon for 2001-2002, 52 cents per
gallon for 2003-2004, and 51 cents per gallon for 2005-2007.
The current motor fuels tax exemptions are extended
generally for the period concurrent with the extension period
for the taxes.
Refund procedures are combined for all taxable motor
fuels, so that aggregation of quarterly amounts and filing of
refund claims is allowed, once a single $750 minimum
amount is reached.
The effective date of the requirement that terminals offer
dyed fuel is delayed for two years, to July 1, 2000.
The 1.25-cents-per-gallon general fund excise tax on fuel
used in trains that was set to expire on Sept. 30, 1999, is
repealed, effective Nov. 1, 1998.
Beginning in 1998, cash compensation may be offered by
employers to employees as an option in lieu of any qualified
transportation benefit, or a combination of any of such
benefits. No amount is includible in gross income or wages
merely because the employee is offered the choice of cash
and one or more qualified transportation benefits. The
amount of cash offered is includible in income and wages
only to the extent the employee elects cash.
The exclusion from income for transit passes and van-
pooling provided by employers is increased to $100 per
month, beginning after 2001. This amount is indexed for
inflation, beginning after 2002. H.R. 2400, 105th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1998).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
employed part time as an airline pilot. The taxpayer
purchased a ranch on which the taxpayer bred, raised and
sold cutting horses. The ranch never showed a profit and had
limited receipts from sales in most years. The court held that
the operation was not operated with the intent to make a
profit because (1) the taxpayer did not keep complete and
accurate records for the horse activity; (2) the taxpayer did
not have a plan to make the activity profitable; (3) although
the taxpayer had some experience with cutting horses, the
taxpayer had little knowledge of the economics of the horse
business; (4) the taxpayer received substantial personal
pleasure from the activity; (5) the taxpayer’s substantial
amount of time spent at the activity primarily involved the
personal pleasure aspects and not the business details; (6) the
taxpayer had no reasonable expectation of a profit either
from the sales or appreciation of business assets; (7) the
activity produces only losses; and (8) the taxpayer had
substantial income from employment which the horse
activity losses offset. Rinehart v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1998-205.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for the
period July 1, 1998 through September 30, 1998, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments is 7 percent and for
underpayments is 8 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 10 percent. Rev. Rul.
98-32, I.R.B. 1998-__.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT. The taxpayer owned a
storage facility used to warehouse clothing and other items
sold through the taxpayer’s mail order catalogs. The facilities
had elaborate shelving systems, one of which was integrated
into the structure of the building, the other existed inside and
was independent of the building structure. The court held that
neither shelving system was tangible personal property
eligible for the investment tax credit. L.L. Bean v. Comm’r,
98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,454 (1st Cir. 1998), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1997-175.
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PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.02[3].*
SALE OR EXCHANGE. A corporation and an individual
formed a partnership. The corporation contributed its stock to
the partnership through an intermediary temporary
corporation and the individual contributed business assets.
The corporation received an interest in the partnership and
the individual received an interest in the partnership plus
some of the stock of the corporation contributed to the
partnership. The IRS ruled that the individual’s contribution
of business assets in exchange for the partnership interest and
corporation stock was a sale or exchange as if between the
partnership and a nonpartner. However, under I.R.C. § 1032,
any gain to the partnership would not be recognized to the
extent of the corporation’s distributive share of partnership
income. Ltr. Rul. 9822002, Oct. 3, 1997.
TIMBER INCOME. The taxpayer partnership operated a
timber products business which makes various engineered
lumber products from trees and scrap wood purchased from
other companies. Under I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E), partnerships
which otherwise would be treated as corporations for federal
income tax purposes are treated as partnerships if 90 percent
of their income comes from processing or marketing of
natural resources, such as wood. The IRS ruled that the
partnership’s income from the production and sale of
engineered wood products, the marketing and sale of these
wood products, and the providing of marketing services for
third parties was qualifying natural resource income for
purposes of I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E). Ltr. Rul. 9822034, Feb.
26, 1998.
The taxpayer was a limited partnership which owned
interests in several limited partnerships (LPs). The taxpayer
owned and operated timberland properties and timber
processing operations. The taxpayer's business consisted
primarily of the growing of timber for sale in domestic and
export markets and the processing of timber into lumber and
chips. In addition to its direct timber operations, the taxpayer,
through its interests in the LPs, owned and operated a wood
products purchase and resale business. This business
acquired wood products and poles from lumber mills,
including lumber mills owned indirectly by the taxpayer
through its interests in  the LPs. Some of these products were
treated or sealed for the account of the LPs and sold by the
LPs in treated form. The taxpayer also bought and resold
poles purchased in both treated and untreated form. The
taxpayer also acquired untreated poles and had them treated
by third parties prior to sale as treated poles. The IRS ruled
that the taxpayer's income from the sale of wood products
and poles would be treated as qualifying income for purposes
of §7704(d)(1)(E). Ltr. Rul. 9822035, Feb. 26, 1998.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in May 1998, the
weighted average is 6.63 percent with the permissible range
of 5.97 to 7.03 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable range)
and 5.97 to 7.29 percent (90 to 110 percent permissable
range) for purposes of determining the full funding limitation
under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 98-32, I.R.B. 1998-22, 23.
RETURNS. The IRS has ruled that it will not refuse to
issue a Trust Identification Number (TIN) to a trust merely
because the trust appeared to be a potentially abusive trust.
The IRS will refuse to issue a TIN if Form SS-4 is not
submitted or is submitted with inaccurate or incomplete
information. SCA 1998-005.
The IRS has provided guidance relating to the waiver of
penalties announced in IR-98-28 for the failure to deposit
penalty under I.R.C. § 6656 for certain taxpayers first
required to make federal tax deposits by electronic funds
transfer beginning on or after July 1, 1997. Notice 98-30,
I.R.B. 1998-22, 9.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer S
corporation was engaged in the purchase, rehabilitation,
redesign, and rental of industrial buildings. The taxpayer
hired an unrelated corporation to manage the properties, with
both corporations providing services to the tenants, including
interior and exterior maintenance, landscaping, renovation
and remodeling, construction and maintenance of dock areas,
and construction of fences, walls, and walkways at the
request of tenants. The IRS ruled that the rental income from
the properties was not passive investment income to the
taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 9823019, March 5, 1998.
TIMBER. The taxpayer was a private foundation to which
standing timber was contributed in the form of several
individual donative timber deeds with a duration of  years,
after which time any uncut timber will revert to the
contributors. The taxpayer offered the timber for disposition
in a competitive bidding process immediately following
receipt of each donation. Under the sales contracts, the
taxpayer authorized the buyer to cut and remove, and the
buyer agreed to cut and remove, all designated merchantable
timber in the contract area. The buyer paid a bid deposit to
the taxpayer which was held by the taxpayer until the buyer
has complied with all provisions of the contract. In addition,
the buyer provided a performance bond and a payment bond.
The buyer paid the taxpayer twice monthly for all timber cut
and removed in the previous half-month period, based on the
unit prices for each species set out in the contract, multiplied
by the scaled volume of timber of that species cut and
removed in that period. Title to the designated timber,
including the risk of loss due to casualty, stayed with the
taxpayer until the timber was severed and paid for by the
buyer. The contracts’ terms were for three years, with
extensions of up to a year. The IRS ruled that the sales met
the requirements of I.R.C. § 631(b) because the taxpayer
would be considered the owner of the timber. Ltr. Rul.
9822020, Feb. 18, 1998.
TRUSTS. A “pure trust” is sometimes referred to as a
constitutional trust or as a common law trust or as a contract
trust. Certain promoters sell these arrangements as tax
shelters arguing that they are merely contracts between the
grantor and the trustee and thus are not taxable under the
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10, which
provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the
obligations of contracts. The IRS position is that such trusts
are taxed either as a separate entity required to file Form
1041 or taxed to the individual owner of the trust. In all
cases, taxpayers who request an EIN have only options
provided on the Form SS-4, and either the taxpayer or the
entity must report and pay the tax. Notice 97-24, 1997-16
I.R.B. 6 deals with abusive or bogus trust schemes and makes
clear that the substance of the transaction controls who must
report and pay the taxes due. SCA 1998-006.
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3d Annual
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 4-8, 1999
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1999! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 4-8,
1999 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a
continental breakfast and break refreshments included in the registration fee.  Each participant will
receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 430 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated
Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
exclusion (or deduction), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to
minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and
"hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts
.  • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights
at a busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Royal Waikoloan Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the
Agricultural Law Manual., or Principles of Agricultural Law The registration fee for nonsubscribers is
$695.
Subscribers should receive a brochure in the mail soon or call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-
1958.
